I. Overview
A casual tourist can confirm that technologies often make their way from the developed world to the less developed countries (LDCs). However, despite the critical importance of technology diffusion for economic development, the evidence on many aspects of this process remains sketchy: What mechanisms do LDC firms rely on most heavily to acquire foreign technologies, and why do they favor these mechanisms over others? How dramatically does the foreign knowledge that LDC firms acquire affect their productive efficiency and the quality of their products? This paper develops a new methodology for addressing these issues and applies the framework to plant-level panel data from Colombia, Mexico and Morocco.
A. The existing literature
Our limited understanding of international knowledge diffusion does not derive from neglect of the topic. In the empirical economics literature alone, at least three different methodological approaches have been deployed. First, a number of analysts have used case studies and qualitative surveys to generate descriptions of learning processes at individual firms (e.g., Hobday, 1995; Lall, 1987; Katz, 1987; Pack, 1987;  Rhee, Ross-Larson and Pursell, 1984) . As Pack (1999) observes, this literature provides invaluable details concerning firms' efforts to absorb technology. But it has to little to say quantitatively about the results of these efforts in terms of productive efficiency or product quality. There are some exceptions (e.g., Pack, 1987) , but they are too few and based on such small samples that they provide little basis for generalization.
At the other extreme, studies based on aggregated data have correlated crosscountry patterns of productivity growth or productivity levels with various proxies for countries' exposure to foreign knowledge and/or their ability to absorb it. These proxies include capital goods imports (e.g., de Long and Summers, 1991; Keller, 2000) , trade with countries possessing large R&D stocks (Coe and Helpman, 1995; Keller, 1998; Keller 2000) , foreign direct investment inflows (Blomstrom, Lipsey and Zejan, 1994) , and domestic patent stocks (Eaton and Kortum, 1996) . 1 Unlike case studies and descriptive surveys, cross-country regressions document broad patterns of association, and in that sense they provide a basis for generalization. However, most are subject to a variety of econometric criticisms, including aggregation bias, omitted variable bias, measurement error bias, and simultaneity bias.
Finally, plant or firm-level econometric studies correlate proxies for firms' exposure to foreign knowledge with their productivity levels or growth rates. To cite a few examples, Aitken and Harrison (2000) , Haddad and Harrison (1993) Hoekman and Djankov and Hoekman (2000) study foreign direct investment; and Chen and Tang (1987) , Aw and Hwang (1995) , Clerides et al (1998) , Kraay (1998) , and Bigsten et al (2000) study exports. 2 By sacrificing the nuance and detail provided by case studies, these micro econometric studies gain the ability to treat large numbers of producers and make statistical inferences. They also do better than the macro studies in terms of identifying the specific correlates of productivity and avoiding aggregation bias. Unlike the other studies mentioned here, Eaton and Kortum (1996) do not attempt to empirically isolate a conduit for knowledge transfer 2 A more extensive literature review may be found in Tybout (2000) caused what. Even studies that use lagged exports to predict current efficiency may miss the knowledge transmission mechanism. A second problem is that productivity is almost always poorly measured. 3 Manufactured products are quite heterogeneous, even within narrowly defined industries, so there is no single measure of output that can be compared across firms. Real revenue is typically used as a stand-in for physical product, but this variable responds to product-specific price adjustments as well as fluctuations in physical volume, so productivity measures confound productive efficiency and market power.
Finally, like the cross-country regressions, studies in this literature almost always focus on a single conduit for international technology diffusion and ignore the others, opening the door to omitted variable bias.
B. The contribution of this paper
This paper is an econometric study based on plant-level data, so it falls squarely in the third category mentioned above. But we attempt to improve on existing methodologies in two respects. First, we abandon the standard approach to measuring productivity in favor of an alternative approach that treats the observed plant-level data on revenues, costs and market shares as reflecting equilibrium in a differentiated product market. By using a new normalization and imposing sufficient demand-side structure, we avoid the problem of distinguishing real revenue from physical product. We are also able to distinguish process innovations, which are manifest in marginal cost reductions, from 3 Few studies in the other literatures do better, but Pack (1987) is an exception. He uses detailed information on machines and workers at a sample of plants to calculate high quality productivity indices.
product innovations, which are manifest in heightened demand for a product at a given vector goods prices.
Second, we treat multiple channels for international technology diffusion in a single integrated framework. This would not be important if the various activities that transmit technology were unrelated to one another. But because of complementarities and indivisibilities, they tend to come in bundles and/or in predictable sequences. 4 Hence econometric models that treat any one of them as the unique source of foreign technology run considerable risk of misattribution. • Foreign direct investment in domestic enterprises;
• joint ventures;
• outsourcing;
• licensing arrangements;
• importation of intermediate and capital goods;
• learning from exporting to knowledgeable buyers;
• learning from final goods imported, and reactions to changes in domestic market structures as these goods enter the country.
What form might the complementarities take? Table 1 lists the main knowledgetransmitting activities identified by the case study literature. It is not hard to identify reasons why firms' decisions regarding these activities will be related to one another. 4 Milgrom and Roberts (1990) make a similar point in their paper on the adoption of new technologies and organizational strategies. They do not consider international trade in goods, ownership, or information, so their list of activities differs somewhat from those that we focus on. Nonetheless, their basic analytical point translates to our setting, mutatis mutandiswhen non-convexities and complementarities characterize the profit function, it may well be optimal to adopt bundles of new activities at once. 
II. Methodology
To organize our analysis, we begin by sketching a dynamic model of industrial evolution in which each firm makes optimal decisions concerning its activity bundles.
Our notion of industry equilibrium is similar to the ones described by Pakes (2000) and Ericson and Pakes (1995) , although we simplify by ignoring firm entry and exit. We also generalize by characterizing firms' performance in several dimensions and by allowing firms to use multiple (costly) activities to control the evolution of their performance indicators. Although we shall not estimate all of the structural parameters in this model, it will allow us to be explicit about the causal relationships that we assume have generated the data.
A. The Conceptual Framework

Performance determinants:
Let us begin with a representation of performance determinants. From the perspective of managers, the activities in Table 1 
where
, it is a serially uncorrelated vector of unobserved innovations in the it process, and the column vector of dummies y it summarizes the i th firm's status in terms of each of the possible activities at time t.
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Our core empirical exercise on performance determinants will be to quantify the relationship described by equation (1). As in Clerides et al (1998) , we shall view significant associations between dummies for lagged activity bundles and the it trajectories as evidence that the associated bundles transmit knowledge. That is, we shall look for Granger causality from activities to performance.
This approach to inference should pick up most instances where knowledge acquired through observable activities enhances future product quality or productive efficiency. However, there are some types of linkages between activities and performance that it will fail to detect. For example, suppose a foreign corporation subcontracts with a particular plant to become a supplier for one its products, and it transmits the necessarily technical information to that plant. It may be years before the plant actually begins to 5 . That is, the j th element of y it takes a value of one in period t if the firm is engaged in the j th activity during that period, and otherwise takes a value of zero. export the product to the buyer (e.g., Kim, 1997) so when the associated exports show up in the data, the plant's performance trajectory will have already responded to the new knowledge and no association will be detected. In fact, this scenario would generate the misleading econometric impression that the outsourcing activity responded to a productivity shock rather than vice versa.
Equation (1) will also miss technology diffusion that does not occur at the firm level. For example, if firms acquire imported intermediate or capital inputs through an intermediary rather than by purchasing directly from foreign suppliers, the associated improvement in performance will not be attributed to foreign sources. Similarly, if firms that learn by engaging in international business serve as valuable examples for others, the knowledge spillovers they generate will not be attributed to foreign sources.
For both of these reasons, we shall examine cross-plant correlations between international activities and our performance measures. These correlations will establish whether significant linkages exist without attempting a causal ordering.
Activity determinants
How are the activities themselves chosen? For reasons that will soon become clear, it is infeasible to estimate a structural model of activity choices. We nonetheless sketch the behavioral model we have in mind to motivate our reduced-form econometric models.
Broadly speaking, we envision firms weighing three kinds of effects on their profit streams when choosing activity bundles. First, as described by equation (1), activities influence future realizations on the performance trajectories, it . In so doing they may also affect the future activity choices and performance of competing firms.
Second, given the it realization, activity bundles can affect net operating profits by changing demand conditionse.g., providing access to foreign marketsor by affecting the share of operating profits retained by the firm's majority owners. Finally, the initiation of activities generally involves start-up or adjustment costs.
The specifics of these effects on profits depend upon the activity in question. For example, joint ventures, subcontracting and FDI may transmit knowledge and/or improve a firm's access to inputs, thereby affecting the evolution of its performance vector, it .
These activities may also affect its operating profits by creating new markets for its products, by branding its products, by creating profit-sharing obligations, and/or by diluting corporate control. Finally, joint ventures, subcontracting and FDI involve upfront research costs and legal fees when they are initiated.
Similar observations apply to the other activities in table 1. Firms that import intermediate or capital goods improve their performance trajectories by using higher quality inputs and by extracting knowledge from these foreign goods. But they also incur higher material or capital costs and, prior to importing, they must research foreign suppliers and learn about customs procedures. Firms that employ high quality workers typically improve their processes and their products, but they also incur higher labor costs, and they bear the sunk costs of attracting and screening job applicants for these positions. Finally, firms that export improve their earnings by tapping new markets, and they may learn from knowledgeable buyers abroad. But to begin exporting, firms must establish distribution channels, research foreign markets, and re-package and/or even redesign their products.
To bring these three effects together, let 
whereι is a K by one vector of ones.
We assume that the i th firm chooses y it trajectories to maximize the expected present value of the profit stream implied by (2), given the information set it observes. In doing so, it must formulate expectations on the evolution of the profit function arguments As in Pakes and Ericson (1995) , we presume Markov-perfect, Bertrand-Nash equilibria in the product market, so current performance vectors and market conditions are sufficient to determine current operating profits.
, the analogous set of variables for competing plants, ) , (
and a set of beliefs concerning the decision rules that each competing firm uses to map these combined information sets onto its own activity choices.
Define the union of the information sets that the i th firm observes as
, where upper-case bold variables without i subscripts or -i superscripts are matrices that pool information on all firms in the market. ( )
where E t is an expectations operator conditioned on
and it Ψ , and δ is the oneperiod discount factor. Equivalently, the i th firm's manager can be viewed as choosing the
The i th firm's decision rule is thus:
That is, it chooses the activity bundle that maximizes current pay-offs, net of sunk startup costs, plus the discounted future value of the net profit stream. In equilibria, when they exist, optimal decision rules must be consistent with prior beliefs for all firms.
For present purposes, the relevant message of equation (4) is that activity choices depend upon ) , , (
This expression motivates the reduced-form multinomial profit that we discuss further in section IIC below. It has several implications. First, activity choices at the i th firm depend upon the performance histories of all firms, so without more structure the dimensionality of the explanatory variable set will be unmanageable. Summary statistics that describe the productivity levels of competing firms and their exogenous characteristics will be necessary. Second, activities generally depend upon activity histories, both because startup costs mean firms want to avoid repeatedly starting and starting and because past activities affect future performance trajectories (as well as the behavior of competing firms). The number of lags on y it is the number of lags that help predict it in equation
(1). Third, since we have assumed that firms do not see their it realizations before choosing y it , their choices are independent of it so long as it is serially independent.
(Otherwise it would be necessary to treat y it and it as jointly endogenous.) Hence it will be critical to test for serial correlation in the disturbances for equation (1a) and (1b).
B. An Empirical Model of Performance Determinants
Now consider the problem of measuring the performance vector, . This vector should respond to process innovations that reduce the marginal costs of creating a unit of output ( it c ) and it should respond to product innovations that improve the attractiveness ( it a ) of the firm's product to consumers. Somehow we must measure these concepts using plant-level data on revenues, intermediate input costs, market shares, labor costs, and crude capital stock proxies.
Without specific information on product characteristics and prices we can accomplish this task only by imposing considerable structure on the data. For this we use Lu and Tybout's (2000) adaptation of Berry's (1994) representation of a differentiated product market, which in turn is based on McFadden's (1974) nested logit demand system and the generalizations developed by Berry, Levinsohn ad . The following paragraphs paraphrase Berry (1994) and Lu and Tybout's (2000) adaptation.
We begin by assigning each producer in the industry of interest to one of G geographic regions ("nests"). Producers in all regions compete with one another and with a composite imported good, but consumers view products within a region as closer substitutes than products coming from distinct regions. The price of the composite imported good is exogenously determined by the real exchange rate. At time t there are N t domestic producers, indexed by
, each supplying its own unique variety. So counting the composite imported good (identified by j = 0) there are N t +1 available varieties at time t. Finally, j Ω is the set of product varieties included in product j's nest (including product j itself).
Domestic consumers have heterogeneous tastes, indexed by the real number
. Each period, each consumer in the market chooses a single unit of the variety that yields him or her the largest net indirect utility, where variety j yields consumer l net utility: Integrating over domestic consumers yields the standard nested logit expression for the demand for the j th domestic variety as a fraction of total domestic demand for varieties in the j th product's nest:
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As σ goes to zero, within-group correlation of utilities goes to zero, and asσ goes to unity, withingroup correlation goes to unity.
Similarly, total demand for group g varieties as a share of total domestic consumption is
and the demand for the imported variety as a share of total domestic consumptioni.e., the import penetration rateis:
Hence demand for the j th variety as a fraction of total units sold is s jt, = s j|g,t ⋅s g,t . Further, given the equilibrium prices and market shares, it is possible to solve for the quality of domestic good j by using the expressions for mean utility,
Our quality measure, it a , is simply a normalized version of jt ξ . Without loss of generality we set the mean utility from imports to zero ( t u 0 = 0) and we measure the quality of domestic good j relative to the quality of imports as:
Note that equation (9) does not explain how jt a is determined; in fact causation flows from the left-hand side to the variables on the right-hand side. Rather it provides a way to solve for an unobserved vector in terms of observed vectors and parameters that can be estimated. Note that equations (7) and (8) (7), (8) and (9).
(Mixed pricing strategies are disallowed.) The resulting first order conditions imply that equilibrium operating profits are:
where t j c , is the marginal cost of production for the j th producer. Further, equilibrium prices and market shares are related to one another by
.
Note that equations (10) More precisely, we calculate t M using a constant real exchange rate to convert real dollar imports to pesos in all years. Thus we are assuming that the real dollar cost of imports corresponds to the volume of intermediate goods used to produce them. Our approach to measuring imports also implies that foreign producers do not adjust their dollar price in response to exchange rate fluctuationsthat is, we assume complete pass-through. This implication is consistent with our expressions for equilibrium market shares and prices, which are based on the premise that the price of the outside good does not respond to adjustments in the prices of the domestically produced varieties. While the empirical literature suggests that the dollar prices of imported goods are likely to respond some to exchange rate fluctuations (Knetter and Goldberg, 1997) , our assumption does not seem too far from reality. .
Given values for the parameters that appear in equation (9), we can use our panel data to infer plant-specific trajectories for the product quality index (a). We can then use these trajectories and the marginal cost trajectories (c) to investigate whether process innovations (increases in a) and product innovations (reductions in c) are related to firms' activity histories. More precisely, our estimated version of equation (1) amounts to the following set of autoregressive equations: 
The vector x includes a time trend, initial capital stocks, and dummies for geographic region that control for regional factor price variation and agglomeration economies.
Finally, there may be persistent unobserved plant characteristics that affect product quality or productive efficiency, so we need to deal with initial conditions problems in equations (1b) and (1c). We do so using Wooldridge's (2000) ε , the endogeneity of y it −1 with respect product quality and marginal cost histories will not induce asymptotic bias in our estimator.
The demand side parameters could be identified using maximum likelihood or the method of moments to estimate (1a) and (1b), using the identity (9). But equation (11) also provides some useful identifying restrictions. Accordingly, we generalize (9) to allow for noise in the relationship between market shares and prices and we add it to our system. Lu and Tybout (2000) discuss several ways to allow for noise in (9) 
Assuming that
ε is independent of intermediate expenditures and i.i.d. normal with zero mean, it is straightforward to incorporate (13) in our likelihood function.
C. An empirical model of activity determinants
(Aart describes the multinomial probit model here)
III. Empirical Results
A. Descriptive analysis of activity dynamics
To implement our estimator, we require panel data on an industry that faces significant import competition, yet also engages in at least several of the activities identified in Table 1 . Ideally we would like to study all of the activities identified there, but unfortunately the data sets at our disposal describe only several. We therefore must focus on different menus of activities in different data sets.
Colombia
The Colombian data set, with which we shall begin, reveals whether firms are exporting and whether they are importing intermediate goods. These are two activities that, in different contexts, have been independently credited with leading to process or product innovations. Yet they have not been studied together, nor are we aware of any attempts to link either to product (quality) innovations. For the purposes of this paper, the most interesting feature of these activities is the extent to which they are interdependent with each other. We address this issue with the help of Table A1 .2, which demonstrates that importing and exporting are contemporaneously highly correlated across firms in our sample. While 19 (30) percent of the observations in our sample correspond to firms which export (import), fully 44
(70) percent of the firms which import (export) are also exporters (importers). The bottom two panels of the table illustrate the dynamic interdependence between these activities.
As others have noted, firms' export status is highly persistent: the probability that a firm which does not export in the current year becomes an exporter in the following year is only 3.6 percent (e.g., Roberts and Tybout, 1997) . However, if we subdivide nonexporters in the current year into those that import and those that do not, the probability of becoming an exporter in the following year conditional on having imported in the current year is more than three times as large as the probability of becoming an exporter conditional on not having imported in the current year (8.9 percent versus 2.3 percent). A simple chi-squared test overwhelmingly rejects the null hypothesis that the decision to export at time t+1 is independent of a firms' import status at time t.
Mutatis mutandis, the same observation holds for the decision to import.
Unconditionally, the probability of becoming an importer if a firm did not import in the previous year is 4 percent. However, among exporters, the probability of becoming an importer is 10 percent, which is nearly three times as high as the probability that a non-exporter becomes an importer (3.5 percent). Again a simple chi-squared test strongly rejects the null of independence between a firm's decision to import and its lagged exporter status.
Finally, Table A2 .2 shows that similar patterns hold over three-year time horizons, as well as industry by industry. In both cases the decision to break into export markets (begin importing) depends upon on whether a firm was an importer (exporter) three years earlier, and this dependence is highly statistically significant. Table A1 .3 reports similar information from a panel of annual observations on about 4000 manufacturing firms in Morocco over the period 1985-95. (check exact number). In Morocco, we observe whether firms export or not, and whether a portion of the equity of the firm is owned by foreigners or not. Again the dependence between these two activities is strongly apparent, both contemporaneously and over time.
Morocco
Contemporaneously, the probability that firms export given that they have FDI is nearly twice as large as the unconditional probability (47.5 percent versus 24.8 percent).
Similarly, the probability that a firm with foreign equity participation commences exporting is significantly higher than the probability that a firm without foreign equity does the same (8.1 percent versus 3.2 percent), and the probability that a firm that exports acquires foreign participation is significantly higher than that of a non-exporting firm (7.5 percent versus 2.6 percent).
Mexico
Finally we consider evidence on the interdependence between activities from a panel of Mexican manufacturing firms over the period [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . This data set differs from the other two in that we have information on three potential channels of technology diffusion: exporting, importing intermediates, and importing capital goods. It also differs in terms of coverage, since only the larger manufacturing firms are included.
(Further details on the data set may be found in Tybout and Westbrook, 1995.) The top panel of Table A1 .4 reports the eight by eight transition matrix of possible combinations of activities. The next three panels focus on the decisions to begin exporting, to begin importing capital goods, and to begin importing intermediates, respectively. Consider first the decision to begin exporting, which unconditionally occurs in 5.3 percent of all cases. However, among firms that import either capital goods or intermediates, the probability of beginning to export is substantially higher than for those firms that do not import anything (9.2 percent versus 3.7 percent). Further subdividing imports into capital and intermediates, there appears to be less distinction between the two in terms of their effects on the decision to export. Firms that import intermediates are marginally more likely to begin exporting than firms that import capital goods (9.7 percent versus 8.7 percent).
The next panel of Table A1 .6 considers the decision to begin importing capital goods, which occurs in 8.7 percent of all cases. The next four lines show that firms that import intermediates are substantially more likely to begin importing capital goods (15.5 percent versus 6.7 percent), as are firms that are already exporting (16.6 versus 7.2). The last panel shows that the decision to begin importing intermediates (which occurs in 7.8 percent of all cases) also depends substantially on whether firms engage in importing capital goods or exports (16.0 versus 6.9 percent for the former, and 19.2 versus 6.5 percent for the latter.
In summary, the simple descriptive evidence here is strongly suggestive that there are both static and dynamic interactions between different activities associated with technology diffusion, and it is therefore important to study them as bundles of activities.
However, it is difficult to assign any structural interpretation to these patterns -for this we need a more formal econometric model, which is described in the following section.
C. Reduced form results on activity dynamics
(Aart discusses Multinomial probit results here)
D. Do activities affect performance dynamics?
To implement our analysis of product and process innovation we must focus on narrowly defined industries in which the products of the different firms can reasonably be viewed as substitutes. On the other hand, we need enough firms within the industry to support statistical inference, and we would like them to be geographically spread across several regions to help us pin down the inter-regional elasticity of substitution (and thus the elasticity of demand that firms face). Moreover, we need to study sectors where imported final goods are sufficiently important to play the role of an outside good in our demand system.
Finally, because our estimator imposes considerable demand-side structure on the data, we also require that the number of firms within a region not be too large (eg., more than 40). Large numbers of firms within a region push the implied elasticities of demand so high that the mark-ups observed in the data cannot be reasonably explained at any feasible point in parameter space. We hope to relax these constraints by using more general demand specification like the random coefficient logit developed by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, (1995) . But doing so will involve considerable programming so we begin by simply focusing on those sectors that the nested logit model seems to fit reasonably well.
Colombia
Appendix 2 presents results for a set of 4-digit Colombian industries that satisfy all of these criteria. We begin our discussion with the chemicals industries, which include out of the analysis because it is not clear that the firms in these sectors are producing products that substitute for one another.
Our model, which amounts to equations (1b), (1c) and (13), is fit for all sectors with 4 lags on quality and marginal cost variables, given that models with three lags often led to significant coefficients on the elements of 3 -it ω . (This suggested that models with three lags might exhibit serial correlation in their disturbance terms.) Also, given that the time required for our estimator to converge increased with the number of parameters, we dropped the regional dummies after discovering that they were never significant. For the same reason, and also because of colinearity, we dropped all but the first lag on our activity dummies. Although additional lags may be necessary to properly describe the dynamic relationship between activities and performance, they did not seem to influence the outcome of our tests concerning the joint significance of the activity variables.
All of the parameters are estimated jointly, but we break them into separate tables for discussion. Estimates of the demand parameters appearing in equation (13) .53 (for paint, varnish and lacquers) to .98 (for basic industrial chemicals), implying that cross-region substitution is generally less than intra-region substitution, but in several cases the market is essentially national and competition is intense.
10 This result tends to obtain when the number of firms in a nest is large.
Similarly, estimates of α are always positive and almost always significant, so increases in the price of a product generally lead to reductions in own demand. However, the magnitude ofα varies quite substantially across industries, from 2.93 and 1.68 (ISIC 3521 and 3513) to .03 (ISIC 3511 and 3523) . Note that high α values are generally associated with low σ values. This appears to reflect the structure of the equation (13), which essentially pins down the average mark-up as the ratio ) 1 /( σ α − . Finally, the coefficient on the exchange rate is always significant, but in half of the chemical sectors it is negative (ISIC 3522, 3513 and 3523) . This may reflect the fact that we have not used information on the source of imports to construct different exchange rate series for the different 4-digit industries. 10 Since we are treating imports as representing the outside product cluster, σ also indexes the degree of separation between imported and domestic goods Coefficients on the control variables that appear in the quality equation (1b) and the marginal cost equation (1c) are reported in the Table A2 .2. Recall that our quality index describes a product's appeal relative to that of the imported good, so either sign on the trend term is possible. Half of the sectors show no significant trend, once other forces are controlled for, but it appears that the relative quality of domestically produced pharmaceuticals (ISIC 3522) and soaps (ISIC 3523) tended to fall over the sample period while the relative quality of basic industrial chemicals (ISIC 3511) tended to rise. The size of a firm's capital stock may have little to do with the quality of its product, so we were not surprised to find that coefficients on were always insignificant. Finally the distributed lag relationship between current and lagged quality is generally sensible, but in several sectors the fourth lag is quite significant (3511, 3522 and 3523) , suggesting that these industries may have serial correlation in their disturbance terms. Extra caution appears warranted in interpreting the results from these industries. (Note that these are same industries where α is close to zero and σ is close to one.)
The key results concern the coefficients on lagged activities that appear in table A2.3. Recall that the Colombian data allow us to distinguish four possible activity bundles: do nothing, only export, only import intermediates, and export while importing intermediates. The last category is omitted to avoid perfect multicolinearity, so coefficients on the included dummies describe the effect on relative quality of going from doing both activities to one of the other activity bundles. Thus we expect negative signs if doing both activities improves product quality relative to doing one or none. In the four smaller sectors no plants chose the second option so for them the export only dummy was also dropped. Indeed, the absence of observations on export only plants highlights the fact that exporting and intermediate importing often are bundled, and that it would misleading to test for performance effects of one activity while ignoring the other.
Wald tests for the joint significance of the activity dummies in the quality equations are reported in first row of the bottom panel of each χ =11.34. Interestingly, most of the chemicals sectors show no significant relationship between activities and product quality. However there is mild evidence that pharmaceutical firms engaging in both activities improve their product quality, and still milder evidence that soap, detergent or perfume firms engaging in both activities are different from that do one activity at most. In this latter case, however, the coefficient signs suggest that firms that import only do worst of all, while the export only firms do best. Finally, although the Wald statistic is not significant for synthetic resin and plastics producers, the asymptotic z-ratios suggest that doing nothing has a strong negative effect on quality, and (more weakly) that doing both activities is better than just importing intermediates. In sum, while the evidence is not overwhelming, our results hint that interactions with the global economy have improved quality in selected cases.
Consider next the marginal cost equations. Here we expect large capital stocks to be associated with low marginal costs and that generally appears to be the case, although the effect is often weak and, in the resins and plastics sector, it is non-existent. Since we control for persistent unobserved heterogeneity by including 0 i c in the equation, and we include four years of distributed lags, it is not surprising that the explanatory power of our capital variable is limited. Similarly, trends are never particular significant. Unlike the quality equation, our distributed lag coefficients are always well behaved and the fourth lag is never significant.
As for the correlation between activities and marginal cost trajectories, our Wald tests never pick up significant association and none of the relevant asymptotic z ratios is significant. Hence if we had focused only upon marginal cost effects, as, for example in Clerides et al (1998) , we would have found nothing.
Perhaps more importantly, if we had had ignored simultaneity issues and simply examined the correlation between performance measures and activities, we would have uncovered many significant but ambiguous associations. The two left-hand columns of Table A2 .4 reports the results we obtain when we use regress our marginal cost trajectories on activity dummies without including lagged marginal costs or other control variables. Similarly, the two right-hand columns report analogous results when the dependent variable is the quality measure implied by our data and our demand-side parameter estimates in A2.1. (Standard errors are not corrected for serial correlation in the disturbances.) Note that no activity is always associated with the worst quality product, and that importing intermediates but no exporting is always next worst. The highest quality is almost always found at firms that both import their intermediates and export their output. (The only exception is found in the basic chemicals industry, where importing intermediates does not improve quality so long as the plant is exporting.)
By itself, the positive association between product quality and usage of imported intermediates has several interpretations. It might mean that importing intermediates allows a firm to learn something about technology and to permanently increase the quality of its product, as Grossman and Helpman (1991) suggest. 11 Or it might imply that importing intermediates simply allows the firm to produce a better product, but transmits no significant new knowledge (as in Ethier, 1982) . This distinction has important implications for the rate of productivity growth. Our results from the dynamic model (i.e., Table A2 .1) suggest that the former effect may be present, but not in a dramatic way, so the main explanation for the strong static correlation in our data appears to be the former one.
Similar comments apply to our results on exports. The strong correlation between product quality and exports could mean that firms learn from their buyers abroad, or that firms with high quality products are more likely to source their inputs abroad and are better able to export. But we know from Table A2 .1 that exporting does not us help to forecast future activity improvements, so it appears unlikely that exporting causes lasting knowledge transfers that enhance quality. Thus the results on product quality parallel earlier results on productivity with the same data set (Clerides, et al, 1998) .
(other Colombian industries here)
Morocco
Mexico
IV Summary
This paper has several basic messages. The first is that there are both static and dynamic interactions between the activities associated with international technology 11 " . . .
[I]mports may embody differentiated intermediates that are not available in the local economy. The greater the quantity of such imports, the greater perhaps will be the number of insights that local researchers gain from inspecting and using these goods." (Grossman and Helpman, 1991, p. 166) Second, the nature of the relationship among activities is complex. Firms choose them jointly, recognizing at least three kinds of dynamic effects:
• changes in their own productive efficiency and product quality, and induced changes in their competitors' performance vectors;
• changes in their net operating profits through expansions in the set of markets they access or service, and profit-sharing or control effects; and
• threshold costs of initiating new activities or shutting down existing activities.
It would be difficult to implement a structural model of activity choices that rigorously treats all of these benefits and costs. However, using reduced-form dynamic discrete choice framework, we can study the transition dynamics that characterize our data sets.
(summarize Aart's stuff here).
Finally, by imposing enough structure on the production function and the demand system, it is possible to measure product quality and marginal costs at the plant level and to relate the evolution of these variables to firms' activity histories. Doing so, we find strong firm-level persistence in both quality and marginal costs, as expected. However, past international activities do not help much to predict current performance, once past realizations on quality and marginal cost are controlled for. That is, activities do not appear to Granger cause performance.
These tests may miss causal relations between international activities and performance if the activities themselves are mis-measured. For example, technology transfers may be initiated well before the associated activity shows up in the data. Thus we also look at contemporaneous cross-plant correlations between performance measures and activities. The Colombian results imply that firms without international activities produce relatively low quality products, and product quality generally rises as the number of international activities increases. 
APPENDIX I: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF ACTIVITY BUNDLES
